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Introduction 
 
In the last few decades the countries in the MENA-region have witnessed a rise in political Islam 
and the mobilization of conservative and religious forces. At the same time, while these states 
have politically become either increasingly authoritarian and repressive or have consolidated their 
authoritarian character (Akkoyunlu and Öktem 2016; Öktem and Akkoyunlu 2016; Somer 2016; 
White and Herzog 2016), their economies have developed in the opposite direction, becoming 
less regulated and more liberal (Maher 2011; Schwartz 2011; Hanieh 2013; Kus 2014; İşleyen 
2015; Karataşlı 2015). According to the neoclassical liberal paradigm, this development is an 
anomaly, as capitalist development and economic growth are associated with the consolidation 
of the rule-of-law, the expansion of democratic freedoms and greater transparency in the state 
bureaucracy, as more and more human activity is being outsourced to the market rather than 
undertaken by the State (Little 1982; Friedman 1990; Lal 2000). Accordingly, the State takes on 
the role as a mere supervisor of these market-based relations, while dropping to the background 
and individual pursuit of self-interest and self-development through the market become the 
central concern of society, hence fostering liberal democracy (Haggard 1985; Lipset 1995; 
Haggard and Kaufman 1994, 1995). 
However, after four decades of neoliberal reforms, there has not been a single example in the 
MENA-region where this has been the case. In fact, one might argue for an opposite trend, where 
neoliberal reform has become associated with repressive state apparatuses and an increasing 
central role for the State. Furthermore, we can observe a congruence towards the same form of 
government in both democratic and authoritarian countries, namely a populist government 
embodied by a charismatic and authoritarian leader making use of identity politics. Utilizing 
nationalist, religious and conservative symbolism, this leader simultaneously delegitimizes the 
opposition in order to implement otherwise unpopular economic reforms (Roberts 1995; Kienle 
1998; Çinar and Sayin 2014; Öztürk 2016; Selçuk 2016; White and Herzog 2016). How is this 
possible? How can a program that is promoting economic reform and liberal democracy have such 
a detrimental effect? 
In this thesis I will investigate the trajectory of neoliberal reforms in the MENA-region by 
conducting comparative case studies for Egypt and Turkey. The question I pose is the following:  
What has been the implication of neoliberal economic reforms for power configurations in Egypt 
and Turkey and what kind of popular reaction did this provoke? 
Egypt represents a country that has never become fully democratic and therefore, it would not 
be correct to simply state that it has become repressive due to neoliberal reforms and its 
simultaneous incorporation into the network of Global Capitalism. However, I believe it is fair to 
state that Egypt, since the Nasserist period, has significantly altered its state ideology, away from 
pan-Arabism and nationalism towards an orientation to the market and the West, most 
significantly the United States. This has caused resentment among the population and created a 
fertile breeding ground for critical Islamist groups, which they zealously exploited, most notably 
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the Muslim Brotherhood (Anderson 1997; Kienle 1998; Murphy 2002; Berman 2003; Schwartz 
2011; Roccu 2012; Hanieh 2013). 
Turkey, on the other hand, is a parliamentary democracy which has become increasingly 
authoritarian and repressive. In the 16 years of its rule, the Justice and Development Party (Adalet 
ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been able to take control over the media 
and the judicial establishment, and has incorporated the private sector into its own power 
structure, making it subordinate to its own interests (Keyman 2010; Akser and Baybars-Hawks 
2012; Kaya 2015; Akkoyunlu and Öktem 2016; Lüküslü 2016; Öktem and Akkoyunlu 2016; Öztürk 
2016; Somer 2016; White and Herzog 2016). 
What makes the cases for Turkey and Egypt somewhat similar is the fact that both countries have 
witnessed significant economic growth fueled by far-reaching economic reforms pushed for by 
the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), most notably the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Bank. Both economies have been praised by these IFIs in the first decade of this 
century for their rapid economic development and the speed at which they were able to 
implement these reforms. However, also simultaneously, both countries witnessed greater 
economic inequality, an erosion of the middle class and an ever more intrusive state. 
Furthermore, social tension has increased, presenting itself mainly in religious and ethnic terms 
(Berman 2003; Akser and Baybars-Hawks 2012; Roccu 2012; Kaya 2015). Finally, both countries 
have witnessed the eruption of mass protests following these new policies. In 2011 Egypt 
witnessed the Arab Spring, while in 2013 the Gezi-protests shook the foundations of the Turkish 
political establishment. Nonetheless, there are still enormous social, political and economic 
differences between the two countries and therefore, this provides an excellent case study to 
conduct such an analysis; two different countries where the same reforms have created a similar 
reaction. 
By investigating the path of neoliberal development in Turkey and Egypt, I hope to be able to 
explain the seemingly paradoxical outcome of this project, in the sense that neoclassical 
economics assumes the reforms would have the opposite effect (Haggard 1985; Lipset 1995; 
Haggard and Kaufman 1994, 1995). The hypothesis I propose is that neoliberal reforms, as they 
have been drawn up in the Washington Consensus – and later in the post Washington Consensus 
– have spawned a new generation of authoritarian leaders who are skilled in mobilizing the 
masses towards imaginary causes, capitalizing on religious and nationalist beliefs, thereby making 
them less prone and approachable by the Left or other opposition groups, and more importantly, 
being already in a constant mode of mobilization, immobile to other causes. What makes these 
two theoretical frameworks distinct is the fact that they have a different understanding of what 
constitutes the State. The neoclassical liberal paradigm adopts the ideas of Max Weber, where 
the State is being treated as something that is disconnected from society and is impartial; a social 
contract in which the State takes on the responsibility of governing its citizens in a manner that 
benefits the whole of society (Mann 1983; Nordlinger 1988). According to Marxism, on the other 
hand, the State is not an autonomous concept that is being imposed on society, but the form it 
takes is rather being treated as an outcome of Class struggle (Schulman 2003; Albo 2005). 
Therefore – in Marxism – State and Class are inseparable notions “with the latter providing the 
conditions of existence for the former” (Hanieh 2013: 8). This distinction is important because it 
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fundamentally separates them from each other. The neoliberal reforms that have been 
implemented in Turkey and Egypt derive their theoretical legitimization from the Weberian 
assumption that these reforms do not alter the form of the state and, as such, the neoclassical 
liberal paradigm cannot explain the development of authoritarian state forms in an economical 
context, simply because it lacks the epistemological tools to do so. As such, I regard the 
neoclassical liberal paradigm as unsupported and thus, as invalid, lacking severe explanatory 
power. Instead, I will make use of a Marxian/Gramscian/critical theoretical framework. 
Ultimately, the discussion culminates in the question whether the configurations of State power 
in Turkey and Egypt are an outcome of neoliberal reforms or are caused by something that is 
separate from the economic sphere. As I will demonstrate, there is strong evidence that the 
former is the case. 
To understand the deeper structures that lie underneath these processes is relevant due to at 
least two reasons. Firstly, by mapping out the interrelated connection between economic policies 
on the one hand and configurations of political power on the other, policymakers will have the 
tools necessary to assess economic policies not only in narrowly defined economic terms of 
quantitative economic growth, but also in broader terms of qualitative societal benefits such as 
national unity, democracy and realizing national sovereignty. In turn, this forces both mainstream 
academics and policymakers alike to think outside of their comfortable neoclassical paradigm and 
recalibrate their capabilities to distinguish between ‘good’ policies and ‘bad’ ones. Unmasking the 
economic doctrines that have slipped inside our constructed worldviews and are being perceived 
as ‘natural’, ‘universal’ or ‘ahistorical’ is a task not be taken lightly; it will not happen overnight. I 
can only aspire that this paper will make a contribution to this process by adding to the already 
well-established literature on this subject, introducing two cases that were thus far absent from 
this overview. 
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1: Literature Review 
 
With the acceptance of neoliberal economic reforms since the 1980s as the uncontested 
economic logic to achieve welfare maximization, the world has witnessed a turning point in its 
developmental trajectory. The rise of the US hegemony as the protagonist of global capitalism, 
paralleled with the demise of the Soviet Union and attacks on the global Left caused a major shift 
to the Right on the international political spectrum. These turn of events have had a significant 
impact on the developing world in general and on the MENA-region in particular. Located 
between two major economic blocs and possessing vast amounts of energy resources, the MENA-
region is of key strategic importance to the global capitalist system as a whole and control of the 
region is a fundamental factor in determining the world hegemonic power (Amin 2004; Hanieh 
2011; Jones 2012). In this section I will map out the different concepts and theories that are being 
utilized in this paper as it is necessary to provide an overview of the literature on this subject in 
order to give way for a meaningful discussion. I will start by describing neoliberalism and its 
foundations, after which I will explain how this has led to authoritarianism and Islamism. Finally I 
will introduce the Gramscian notion of cultural hegemony, relating it to the subject of this 
research.  
The roots and nature of neoliberalism 
Since a term like neoliberalism is being used and misused interchangeably, I would like to define 
this notion and briefly touch upon the historical context in which it is situated, so as to insure that 
there is no misunderstanding about what this concept entails in its core. 
First, I want to make clear that I do not propose a rigid one-size-fits-all definition of what 
neoliberalism is. Since ideologies are never carried out on a clean slate – as every society has its 
own unique historically defined identity – they all need to address this identity when being 
implemented (Peck 2004). Therefore, a necessary particularism arises and trying to conceive of a 
universal definition of something that inherently does not lend itself to that end would be anti-
productive at most. It would merely keep us in the realm of abstraction, saying nothing 
meaningful about the real world. Since this is an empirical undertaking, I will refrain from any such 
attempt.  
Rather, I believe it is much more valuable to look at the foundation and the characteristics that 
comprise the neoliberal project. An academic undertaking from its inception in the 1940s and 
1950s, it has grown to be a major political and economic force up and until the present day; never 
in a pure form, but adaptive and crafty – fitting the specificities of the societies where it is being 
rolled out – and intrusive and all-encompassing – penetrating every aspect of human social 
interaction and affecting nearly all life on our planet. Derived from classical economics and 
liberalism, it is difficult to point out one specific thinker that has its name unconditionally attached 
to the theory – unlike Marxism or Keynesianism. Instead, its roots can be traced back to a number 
of different schools in different geographies during the previous century; including the Austrian 
School which is associated primarily with the economist Friedrich von Hayek; the works of the 
writer and philosopher Ayn Rand, the most famous of which is her philosophical novel Atlas 
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Shrugged; and the Chicago School, which spawned many theorists like Milton Friedman and Gary 
Becker, whose work would later have a great impact on US economic policy through key figures 
like Alan Greenspan, Chair of the Federal Reserve System from 1987 to 2006. Tracing its roots 
from such diverse sources it is – like Jamie Peck (2004: 400) accurately points out – “the 
combination of these various and somewhat disparate intellectual strands … that has shaped what 
we now understand to be neoliberalism, which encompasses an always problematic alliance 
between anti-statist libertarianism on the one hand and authoritarian interventionism on the 
other”. In this last part Peck captures a very important aspect of neoliberalism, namely the 
dilemma that lies at the foundation of its logic: how to reduce the role of the State while 
simultaneously a strong State is required to implement neoliberal reforms and in turn needs to 
safeguard the workings of the “free market” it has implemented? 
In the present day, we can identify some basic characteristics of neoliberal policy: privatization, 
circumscription of social benefits, the reduction of barriers to capital flows, and the imposition of 
market imperatives throughout all spheres of human activity (Hanieh, 2013: 14). According to 
market logic, these policies will greatly benefit the life of ordinary citizens. Due to the constant 
pressure of competition, entrepreneurs are encouraged to allocate scarce resources in the most 
cost-effective and thus most efficient manner. As production is constantly under pressure to reach 
maximum efficiency and the drive to innovate is triggered by rising consumer demand, society 
will be able to achieve the best possible resource allocation to reach maximum welfare without 
the intervention of the State. Simultaneously, the distribution of this welfare is dependent upon 
the principle of meritocracy; the more productive one is and thus the more one contributes to 
society, the more one is entitled to reap the benefits of this hard work and gets to share in the 
total pool of welfare (Little 1982; Lal 2000). With neoliberalism, all relations are market relations 
and are expressed in monetary terms1; there exists no collective, mere individuals2; and the State 
is reduced to little more than a regulatory agent making sure that the principles of the free market 
are observed by everyone. It is here that it is distinct from classical liberalism3 that was founded 
by Adam Smith. According to him, there is a role designated to the State as the guardian of its 
citizens by making sure that extreme asymmetries that arise through the “invisible hand” of the 
market are being alleviated. These negative externalities come into existence due to the fact that 
the far-reaching implementation of market imperatives create increased economic inequality, 
which can ultimately lead to social inequality. This is the epitome of what is coined ‘bourgeois 
democracy’ by leftist thinkers and critical theorists like Marx, Lenin and Habermas: a public 
                                                     
1 This is an extreme understanding of neoliberalism and comes to full expression in Ayn Rand’s Atlas 
Shrugged (1957). In this “capitalist manifesto”, which is written like a novel, Rand describes a dystopian 
world that has fallen in decay due to socialist decadency and a state that is interfering into the free market. 
The only thing left to do is to get fully rid of the old order by destroying socialism and thereafter build an 
entire new world from scratch by expressing all human interaction in terms of the market (Achterhuis, 2010: 
75-77, 246-248). Rand’s justification for this is that the highest virtue human beings can aspire is an absolute 
state of rationality and since markets are rational, allocating everything in the most efficient manner, 
human beings should be completely subject to market rationale.  
2 Captured in the notorious words of Margaret Thatcher: “There's no such thing as society. There are 
individual men and women and there are families.” In an interview in Women's Own in 1987. 
3 Liberalism here needs to be read in economic terms, not as political liberalism. 
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domain that should allow an equal representation for all but is nevertheless being reduced to an 
extension of class power and interests (Poulantzas 2000, Harvey 2007, Duelund 2010, Hanieh 
2010). However, according to Milton Friedman, 
Nothing could be further from the truth. Wherever the free market has been 
permitted to operate … the ordinary man has been able to attain levels of 
living never dreamed of before. Nowhere is the gap between rich and poor 
wider … than in those societies that do not permit the free market to operate” 
(Friedman 1990: 146).  
To allow individuals to fully develop themselves, government should be kept at a minimum, only 
allowed to deal with tasks that guarantee individuals’ rights. He also recognizes correctly that 
government is made up of free individuals as well, each pursuing its own individual interest. 
However, throughout his work he treats government – or the State – as something that is 
disconnected from “society” and has been imposed upon free individuals, keeping them from 
pursuing their interests and desires. This understanding of the State is based on a Weberian 
worldview, which lies at the core of classical economics and has had far-reaching implications on 
the neoliberal reforms that have been implemented (Mann 1983; Nordlinger 1988; Albo 2005: 74; 
Hanieh 2013: 8-9). Friedman remarks that there are infinite good causes a government can pursue 
but only limited resources at its disposal. The best way to allocate scarce resources to any of these 
causes is by means of the market, by making interest groups bid for which causes will get on the 
government agenda. But if government is made up of free individuals pursuing their own 
interests, then what keeps these individuals from becoming corrupted by powerful interest 
groups who represent a small proportion of society and want to influence government for their 
own benefit (like lobby groups)? Friedman is unable to formulate a clear answer to this question 
other than the normative ‘should not’. Indeed, regarding his emphasis on the pursuit of self-
interest of the individual, it seems quite impossible to do so within such a framework.  
Nevertheless, there is still a consensus among mainstream economists and academics that there 
is a positive relation between economic reforms and democratic outcomes, although it is being 
debated in which direction this relation points (Haggard 1985; Lipset 1995; Haggard and Kaufman 
1994, 1995). While earlier research conducted mainly by Lipset (1959) suggested that 
democratization necessarily follows economic reform, more recent publications by the World 
Bank and IMF suggest that it is actually the other way around, that “democracy has a positive and 
significant impact on the adoption of economic reforms4 but [that] there is no evidence that 
economic reforms foster democracy” (Paola et al. 2010: 1; Amin and Djankov 2009). 
Simultaneously however, Hoeffler et al. (2012) found that there is a negative correlation between 
national income per capita and democracy, i.e. the higher the income per capita in authoritarian 
countries, the less the incentive for democratization. In contrast, when incomes are low under 
authoritarian regimes, voices for democratization are stronger. This contradicts to some extent 
                                                     
4 With ‘economic reforms’ the authors are referring to neoliberal reforms. It is actually striking and an 
excellent case in point of how neoliberal policy is being propagated with the neutral term of ‘economic 
reforms’. Would a reconstruction of the economy according to socialist or communist principles also be 
referred to as just ‘economic reforms’?  
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the earlier work of Lipset, Seong and Torres (1993) on the relationship between national per 
capita income and authoritarianism. In their study they found an N-curve in this relationship: the 
probability for democratization decreased with development in a middle range of countries 
(between the incomes of $2346 and $5000 in 1980), but increased for countries with lower and 
higher per capita income, i.e. out of these ranges. Taken together, these studies pose a 
problematic paradox, since the conclusion we can logically derive from even the mainstream 
literature is compelling. If democratic state forms lend themselves more to economic reforms 
than authoritarian regimes, income per capita will increase, and in turn there will be less incentive 
to democratize. In short, democratic low-income countries will become non-democratic middle-
income countries, having reached – in game theoretical terms – a Nash equilibrium, meaning that 
the attained status quo is stable as no individual has anything to gain from attempting to alter the 
status quo. However, the opposite is not the case, there is no evidence that nondemocratic 
countries will become more democratic due to a rise in incomes. Rather, democratic or 
nondemocratic, they are more concerned with an even greater rise in income than trying to 
democratize, as Saad-Filho shows for the Brazilian case (2013). 
Free markets as a politically managed process 
To come back to our dilemma then, how to deal with this dichotomy in neoliberal theory between 
strong State presupposition while at the same time undermining State power in favor of Market 
power? Critical theory argues that the supposed dichotomy is a false one: indeed, in line with the 
above, there is no empirical ground to suggest that state power is gradually curbed due to 
neoliberal reforms. In Peck’s (2004) terms, the transformation of state power is not quantitative 
in nature, but rather qualitative. As social spending is cut, state assets are sold, taxes are reduced, 
and markets are being deregulated – simultaneously – policing and defense budgets are up, 
intrusive legislation that undermines civil rights is being implemented, and control over society 
by the state has increased through the expansion of the prison-industrial complex and security-
intelligence agencies (Cole 1999; Roberts, Secor and Sparke 2003; Giroux 2005). As such, the focus 
of state power shifts from social provisions to regulation and control. This is further reflected in 
the fact that the term ‘neoliberalism’ is used primarily by opponents of the policies that can be 
garnered under this banner. For them, these policies are ideologically motivated, while advocates 
present their ideas as objective and embedded in common sense, rather using the terms ‘free 
market capitalism’ and ‘economic reforms’ (see footnote 4). Although mainstream economic 
narratives present this ‘free market capitalism’ as a positive natural outcome of history, there is 
nothing natural about the process. It has been a highly “politically managed and institutionally 
regulated process” (Peck, 2004: 399) from its very start. Nor is it the “endpoint in human history”. 
As Marx had already formulated aptly in his Poverty of Philosophy: 
Economists have a singular method of procedure. There are only two kinds of 
institutions for them, artificial and natural. The institutions of feudalism are 
artificial institutions, those of the bourgeoisie are natural institutions … When 
the economists say that present-day relations – the relations of bourgeois 
production – are natural, they imply that these are the relations in which 
wealth is created and productive forces developed in conformity with the laws 
of nature. These relations therefore are themselves natural laws independent 
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of the influence of time. They are eternal laws which must always govern 
society. Thus, there has been history, but there is no longer any. There has 
been history, since there were the institutions of feudalism, and in these 
institutions of feudalism we find quite different relations of production from 
those of bourgeoisie society, which the economists try to pass off as natural 
and, as such, eternal. (Marx 2008: 131) 
The same holds when we replace the words “bourgeoisie” and “feudalism” with “neoliberalism” 
and “socialism” – or any other non-neoliberal mode of production – respectively. If not natural 
but purposefully crafted, how then did these neoliberal principles materialize? If there has been 
no empirical evidence supporting the claim that market mechanisms foster liberal democracy, 
rather the opposite, why are policymakers so vigorously pursuing such programs? Harvey (2007) 
– in his illuminating essay – argues that neoliberalism developed due to the fact that preexisting 
arrangements of global capital accumulation had exhausted themselves by the 1970s and were in 
dire need of a resolution. Exacerbated through the 1973 Oil Shock, the crisis of global capitalism 
led to rising unemployment and inflation, spawning socialist and communist alternatives to the 
social contract between labor and capital that had worked so well in the immediate post-war 
decades. As such, the ruling capitalist classes felt threatened, both politically and economically; 
“they had to move decisively if they were to protect their power from political and economic 
annihilation” (Harvey 2007: 28). Therefore, the neoliberal undertaking can be viewed in economic 
terms “as a utopian project providing a theoretical template for the reorganization of 
international capitalism or as a political scheme aimed at reestablishing the conditions for capital 
accumulation and the restoration of class power” (28-29). Harvey argues that the latter has 
indisputably dominated as it has succeeded only to that end, claiming that the economic 
“utopian” aspect of neoliberalism has worked merely as a justification and legitimization of the 
overall project. The accounts in history in the last four decades are numerous. The coming to 
power of Reagan and Thatcher in the early 1980s marked a symbolic turning point indeed, but the 
process had been long underway in Chile (1973). Later, the project was to be imposed on Turkey 
(1980), Egypt (1988), Panama (1989) and Peru (1990) to name just a few. Here we can see the 
neoliberal project unfold as a highly orchestrated reform process, often initiated through a coup 
d’état to overthrow a leftist or nationalist government and replace it with an authoritarian 
dictatorship that implements neoliberal reforms in close collaboration with the IFIs; mainly the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB). The aim of these reforms have 
always been the same, although different methods may have been used: connecting the economy 
in question to the global circuits of capital accumulation so as to render the national economic 
interest subordinate to global capital, while simultaneously incorporating the national elite into 
the new global order and aligning its interests with that of global capital accumulation (Roberts 
1995; Stiglitz 2004; Harvey 2007; Hanieh 2011). 
Neoliberal reforms in international perspective 
Before we get into the details of authoritarian neoliberalism and how it came into being, it is 
highly relevant to look at the international context and the role that IFIs play in order to have a 
better understanding of how the power relations of global capital work, since these relations are 
situated at the core of this process. 
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The neoliberal programs have been implemented first and foremost through the mechanism of 
debt. IFIs offered the governments of developing countries cheap loans in order to develop their 
economies. However, when these countries had accepted these loans, which are denominated in 
US dollars, the United States Federal Reserve raised its domestic interest rate, triggering investors 
en masse to invest their money in USD bank accounts, thereby increasing the value of USD and 
raising the debt level of the developing countries that accepted these loan packages. As debt 
levels soar and the risk of default increases, they are forced to take on more debt to avoid 
bankruptcy. However, this time the IFIs put strict conditions on issuing a loan. These conditions, 
euphemistically called Structural Adjustment Packages (SAPs) and later transformed into Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs)5, range from privatization of state assets and the liberalization 
of the capital account to cutbacks on social spending, the closing of bilateral Free Trade 
Agreements with Western powers and legalizing foreign ownership of control. Gray, in the 
Multinational Monitor, comes up with the following:  
[c]ivil service downsizing, privatization of government-owned enterprises with 
layoffs required in advance of privatization and frequently following 
privatization; [p]romotion of labor-flexibility – regulatory changes to remove 
restrictions on the ability of government and private employers to fire or lay 
off workers; [m]andated wage reductions, minimum wage reductions of 
containment, and spreading the wage gap between government employees 
and managers; and [p]ension reforms, including privatization, that cut social 
security benefits for workers (Gray, 2001: 7-8). 
This is exactly what happened in 1979 and is known as the “Volcker Shock”, after Paul Volcker 
who was at that time the chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve (Harvey 
2007, Hanieh 2013: 31). Through this even higher debt level, targeted countries were forced to 
appropriate a higher percentage of their national income to service their debt, sometimes as high 
as 50 percent as in the case of Morocco from 1980 to 1982 (Hanieh 2013: 32). As countries became 
severely indebted, they became vulnerable to being dominated by IFIs and losing sovereign 
control over their economy. As such, their economies were basically being conditioned to the 
needs of global capital, whereby substantive amounts of wealth were being transferred from the 
poorest countries to the most powerful and wealthy ones. Chesnais (2007) keenly remarks that 
the level of autonomy of the subordinated countries depends on the degree of foreign debt they 
hold. Thus, indeed, debt functions as both a power tool to implement desired policies as well as 
a means of wealth transfer: debt is both a means and an end to dominate countries. The more a 
country is indebted, the more its economy becomes subordinated to IFI demands and the more 
foreign currency it needs to earn to service its debt. The outcome is an economy that: produces 
cheap, labor-intensive commodities – due to a cutback on wages and liberalization of the labor 
                                                     
5 The IMF and World Bank recognized the adverse effects of the SAPs and came up with the new PRSP 
approach in 1999. Through this new approach, they attempt to address a country’s “macro-economic, 
structural and social policies and programs over a three year or longer horizon, to promote broad based 
growth and reduce poverty, as well as associated external financing needs and major sources of financing” 
(Craig and Porter 2003: 53). However, there has been a wide discussion about whether this is not just old 
wine in new bottles; see Booth (2005). 
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market; through mostly foreign-owned firms – due to privatization and legalization of foreign 
ownership; whose produces are being exported to highly-developed economies for a low price – 
due to liberalization of the exchange rate; and the earnings of which are being transferred back 
to the creditor (IFI) through service on debt and accompanying interests6. The situation that arises 
is roughly that of a wealthy client that is at the same time creditor to a highly indebted small-scale 
producer and is able to set both the price at which it buys and the rate of interest it charges, even 
after the terms of the loan have been agreed upon. The result is maximum exploitation whereby, 
in terms of real value, the client not only gets his product for bottom prices, he is being accredited 
with a surplus value for the commodities he purchases. Of course this is an oversimplification; in 
reality the creditor and purchaser are not the same entity, neither do State interests and those of 
firms always align. However, both are filling different positions within the system of value 
extraction through capital and thus, they are complementing each other. Harvey (2004) argues 
that geopolitical and economic modes of rule are intertwined in a dialectic relationship: both state 
actors and capitalists need each other to achieve their goal of either territorial or economic 
dominance. From the perspective of the exploited country it does not make any difference; the 
outcome is the same.  
The rise of authoritarian neoliberalism 
Eventually, the neoliberal project culminated in the Washington Consensus in the 1990s and later 
in the post-Washington Consensus in the 2000s, which is the formalization of practices long 
underway in the preceding decade, but is now being officially acknowledged as the economic and 
fiscal policy by all IFIs and the WTO (Harvey 2004, 2007). As such, the prescriptions in the 
Washington Consensus, which are being recognized by nearly all countries in the world through 
membership of the IMF and WTO, are being elevated to the status of objective and neutral 
technical knowledge which have both the legal and moral authority to override democratic 
institutions when seen fit in order to act in the best interest of the people (Heron 2008). This 
opens up a vast number of possibilities for both the ruling capitalist classes domestically, as well 
as for the core capitalist countries internationally. Since neoliberal principles are being legitimized 
as the only means for economic and social prosperity, any deviance or abstention from these 
principles is being portrayed as an attack on democracy, on individual freedom and on social 
integrity. Through this line of reasoning, powerful countries that do uphold and embrace these 
principles (i.e. the US) do not only have the responsibility to intervene in foreign countries and 
their economies, they have the moral obligation to do so (Barnett 2003). Thus, through arguments 
like these, the United States legitimized its invasion, occupation and economic transformation of 
both Afghanistan and Iraq and the economic sanctions against Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Syria 
as well as prewar Iraq and Libya. Here we can clearly see the link between neoliberalism and 
imperialism. The one necessitates the other: political domination precedes economic domination, 
while economic domination reinforces political domination. The result is the undermining of 
national sovereignty and liberal democracy by subordinating it to demands of global capital: the 
                                                     
6 If there are earnings at all, since most foreign firms are exempted from paying taxes in the initial period 
of their operations in countries that have adopted the SAPs (in order to attract foreign investments), and 
thereafter merely a small amount, through so-called Special Economic Zones (SEZs). 
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invisible hand of the free market is complimented with the “hidden fist” (Friedman 1999:373) of 
the United States military (Roberts, Secor and Sparke 2003; Amin 2004; Harvey 2004). 
Authoritarian neoliberalism on the national scale 
According to Gramsci (1971), in his critique on capitalism, there are two ways through which 
States are able to maintain their existence, namely coercion and consent. The first pertains to 
force, terror and control. These are the hard measures through which a state aims to keep its 
subjects in check and tries to minimize the number of disturbances. However, a state that relies 
solely on coercion methods will not be around for very long since this will drive up costs and the 
state will find itself in a position in which it merely tries to survive. Therefore, the state must also 
develop the voluntary consent of citizens to make them support the state system. To make this 
consent possible, Gramsci introduces the notion of cultural hegemony. Cultural hegemony entails 
ideas that are so embedded in society that they are accepted as the Truth and therefore are no 
longer contested. He applied this notion mainly to ideas related to capitalist structures like free 
markets through which the capitalist elite tried to legitimize itself by the use of ostensible 
independent and therefore objective channels of philosophy and science. In this light, ideas like 
free market competition, industrial exploitation and economic dependency, combined with deep-
rooted ideas of colonialism, ought not to be perceived as natural or inevitable phenomena, but 
rather as social constructs imposed on society to help maintain the status quo of the vested ruling 
and capitalist class. In other words, capitalist states legitimize and reproduce themselves by 
diverting the public debate away from the nature of the capitalist structures that make up society, 
indeed denying the very existence of class structures, a narrative the Left in recent decades has 
proved unable to detect as false, let alone to challenge.  
Though it has been effectively disguised, we have lived through a whole 
generation of sophisticated class struggle on the part of the upper strata to 
restore or, as in China and Russia, construct class dominance. This occurred in 
decades when many progressives were theoretically persuaded that class was 
a meaningless category and when those institutions from which struggle had 
hitherto been waged on behalf of the working classes were under fierce 
assault (Harvey 2007: 41). 
This exemplifies how well neoliberal policies have been able to establish themselves as an 
accepted cultural hegemonic idea. Simultaneously, the brokerage of a social contract between 
the capitalist and working classes cannot be equitable when the terms of the social contract are 
based on ideas that the former have imposed upon the latter, for there can be no social rights 
without political rights, both of which start with an emphasis on free, impartial and inclusive 
education by the state (Adorno 1998, Giroux 2014). Without class consciousness, the class 
struggle will always be won by the ruling class and therefore, in neo-Gramscian terms, the (anti-) 
intellectual endeavors of ruling classes to legitimize their position should be considered as 
coercive in nature as well. It is an intellectual form of coercion aimed at creating subjects 
possessing, in Marxian terms, a form of false consciousness. The struggle between classes is a 
struggle about possession of state power. States are not separate entities that stand above society 
in a Weberian fashion (as Friedman would have it), but are rather an integral part of society 
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defined by the outcomes of social configurations (Schulman 2003). As such, states are not 
inherent capitalist in nature, but have evolved that way as an outcome of popular class struggles 
between those who own the means of production and those that do not. By attaining class 
dominance, capitalists then are able to augment their dominance by utilizing the state apparatus 
to further their interests, having at their disposal a vast number of coercive mechanisms to 
achieve and sustain popular consent (Poulantzas 2000, Bruff 2014). Consequently, the state is 
able to implement constitutional and legal changes in the name of economic necessity, ignoring 
the fact that these changes undermine its democratic institutions and social provisions, thereby 
altering both the character and the expectations about the responsibilities of the state: 
This attempted reconfiguring of state and institutional power is threefold: (1) 
the more immediate appeal to material circumstances as a reason for the 
state being unable, despite “the best will in the world,” to reverse processes 
such as greater socioeconomic inequality and dislocation; (2) the deeper and 
longer-term recalibration of the kinds of activity that are feasible and 
appropriate for nonmarket institutions to engage in, diminishing expectations 
in the process; and (3) the reconceptualization of the state as increasingly 
nondemocratic through its subordination to constitutional and legal rules that 
are deemed necessary for prosperity to be achieved. In sum, we are 
witnessing the rise of authoritarian neoliberalism (Bruff 2014: 115-116).  
Here, Bruff has captured accurately the outlines of what constitutes the core of neoliberal 
democracy. Especially the third point is of crucial importance for the sake of this paper and 
deserves more explanation. By presenting, implementing and institutionalizing ideologically 
motivated policies as mere technical and apolitical adjustments for the benefit of society at large, 
the state elevates them from the sphere of public contestation. Once in effect, they are 
withdrawn from the political arena of policy making, incorporated into the status quo and 
presented as natural, neutral and non-negotiable. According to Bruff (2014), Social Democrats 
have been unable to form a counter-narrative, as they have been incorporated into the neoliberal 
project (I will return to this in a later chapter). Through the consolidation of neoliberalism into the 
state infrastructure, any challenges to the status quo are being swept aside as irrational and 
inefficient, detrimental to the smooth functioning of the economy (Harvey 2004; Heron 2008). In 
fact, so powerful is this belief in the market that, in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, it were 
not the ill-implemented policies that were blamed by governments and the IFIs. The narrative that 
was constructed put the blame on anything and everyone, except on neoliberal capitalism. 
“Making capitalism more moral would make no sense; what is required is an increased ethical 
responsibility by individuals” (Amable 2010: 12). Bruff (2014) continues by stating: “crucial here 
has been the relocation of responsibility for the crisis from financial institutions to individuals, 
who ran up large credit card and mortgage debts, and to states, whose inability to regulate 
appropriately resulted in the “immoralization” of finance and, consequently, their own budget 
deficits” (121). And so, while the crisis created an opportunity to transfer wealth from the poorer 
sections of society to the upper strata, there has not been a rollback but an intensification of 
neoliberalism (Bruff 2014, Giroux 2005, Hanieh 2011, Harvey 2007, Peck 2004).  
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Popular reactions 
This immense transfer of wealth caused severe cracks in the theoretical utopia that was 
romanticized by the champions of neoliberalism. As such, the crisis of 2008 was not only a crisis 
of economic recession, it was a crisis of legitimacy for the ruling neoclassical paradigm from which 
the neoliberal policies gained their legitimacy. This is why in the aftermath of the crisis people all 
over the world flocked into the streets to protest. Not for short-term reforms – although these 
were clearly necessary – but for a radical rethinking of and break from the system of “institutional 
violence” (Hanieh 2013, Springer 2011, Giroux 2014). As movements like the Zapatistas, Occupy, 
Gezi and the numerous ones grouped under the banner of the Arab Spring challenged the cultural 
hegemony of neoliberalism that was established by the ruling capitalist classes, they were met 
with force (physical coercion) as governments all over the world heavily depended on riot police 
and other security forces to crack down on protesters, while at the same time used soothing 
language by promising to take measures to end the exorbitant pursuit of decadency and 
corruption of individuals within some of the most influential corporate and government bodies 
(Giroux 2014). Through this carrot and stick method, most governments were eventually 
successful in silencing the protests.  
Nonetheless, it can be argued that neoliberal capitalism as an uncontested ideology died in the 
post-crisis years. It merely lives on as a “soulless institution of rule and coercion”, for it lost 
popular legitimacy. In line with Marx’ reasoning, post-2008 neoliberalism is thus merely a farcical 
repetition of its pre-2008 years (1975). Before, neoliberal logic itself was not being put under 
scrutiny in public discussions and debates, despite the fact that the forces of neoliberal capitalism 
created the very forces that were undermining liberal democracy, like religious fundamentalism. 
In other words, the understanding that religious fundamentalism and other anti-democratic 
movements are a consequence of economic deprivation, or – in Marxian terms – a symptom of 
the same totality, was not widely shared and therefore, neoliberal capitalism was able to survive 
even as a legitimate ideology. It was not until the connection with this totality was made much 
clearer with the 2008 financial crisis that neoliberalism lost some of its popular legitimacy. “The 
crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this 
interregnum a great variety of symptoms appear” (Gramsci 1971, quoted from Bruff (2014: 113)). 
Here, Gramsci touches upon an important aspect of contemporary neoliberal capitalism; the 
symptoms that culminated in the 9/11 crisis arose precisely because no alternative was allowed 
to be presented against the ruling narrative and thus, rather than being challenged directly, the 
narrative spawned perversions of anti-capitalist struggle like religious fundamentalism and right-
wing populism. In Žižek’s (2009) words, “the populist “radical” Right [is] nothing but the symptom 
of liberalisms inability to deal with the Leftist threat” (75). It contains an inability to deal with the 
complexity of the situation and instead relate the negative externalities that arise to some 
external agent. This refusal to engage in intellectual endeavor is what comprises the “fetishistic 
dimension of populism” (61).  
Political Islam is one such a symptom; its growing popularity corresponds roughly with the 
implementation of neoliberal reforms and feeds mainly on the widespread discontent due to 
economic hardships. To define political Islam, or Islamism, which will be used interchangeably 
throughout this paper, I make use of Mozaffari’s definition of the term. According to him, 
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“Islamism is a religious ideology with a holistic interpretation of Islam whose final aim is the 
conquest of the world” (Mozaffari 2007: 21, emphasis added). So the distinction between Islam 
proper and Islamism is the fact that the former is the religion while the latter is the political 
ideology based on that religion. Furthermore, Islamism is not a traditional movement, as many 
adherents would like to believe. Rather, it is a modern manifestation that did not exist before7. 
Since “it takes its ideology from a double source – ideology and religion” (Ibid: 22) it can be more 
appealing to those who share the religious component (i.e. are Muslim) leaving them spiritually 
satisfied in a world that is becoming more and more ‘disenchanted’ (Anderson 1997; Murphy 
2002; Berman 2003; Kaya 2015). 
Now we can complete the Gramscian argument: by losing moral and legitimate ground, consent 
is no longer a viable option through which the neoliberal state is able to survive. To do so it needs 
to delude public attention away from challenging the class structures that are at the nucleus of 
the popular struggle and instead having it focus on a – often imaginary – corrupt segment of 
society. In so doing, inter-class struggles are being transformed into intra-class struggles; the old 
saying “divide and conquer” is appropriate here. Those who refuse to be deluded (i.e. the political 
Left) are being met with coercive force and through the utilization of identity politics are being 
outcast and marked as enemies of the state. The result is a complete and absolute 
delegitimization of any opposition against the established order. As such, we are witnessing the 
rise of religious fundamentalism and right-wing populism in parallel with neoliberal reforms. 
In the next chapters I will introduce how the above relates to Turkey and Egypt, starting with a 
descriptive overview of the economic policies that were implemented in each of these countries. 
 
 
  
                                                     
7 Islamist thinkers towards the end of the 20th century, like Muhammed ‘Abdu, Rashid Rida and Jamal ad-
Din al-Afghani tried to reconcile modern principles from the West with Islam. More contemporary 
Islamists, like Sayyid Qutb, Hasan al-Banna and Abu al-‘Ala’ Mawdudi take an anti-modernist stance and 
reject Western norms and values altogether by trying to replace it with an alternative distinctly Islamic 
model (Cleveland and Bunton 2016). See Nilüfer Göle, "Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: The making of 
elites and counter-elites." The Middle East Journal (1997): 54. 
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2. The Turkish Case: Financial Crises and Economic Growth 
 
The adoption of neoliberal reforms in Turkey is mainly a result of the events that happened during 
the early hours of September 12th 1980; a coup d’état carried out by commanding Army Officer 
Kenan Evren. The cabinet, parliament and all political parties and labor unions were dissolved, 
party leaders were arrested and a general State of Emergency was declared, including a denial for 
anyone to leave the country. The coup came after a decade of unrest between popular leftist and 
rightist movements, which more than once culminated in bloody confrontations, demanding high 
numbers of victims, including the infamous massacres of Taksim in 1977 (35), Bahçelievler (7) and 
Maraş in 1978 (more than 100 people killed). After seizing power, the military junta ruled for more 
than three years, returning to democracy with the national elections on November 6th 1983. This 
resulted in a landslide victory for the newly established ANAP (Anavatan Partisi, Motherland 
Party) headed by Turgut Özal who was behind the economic reforms in the final pre-coup years 
and who also worked in close collaboration with the military government in their years of reign 
(Zürcher 1993: 292). However, by being democratically elected he garnered recognition and 
legitimacy to push his reforms further. These reforms were based on an IMF Stabilization 
Programme of 1979 which the government at that time was unable to implement due to the 
heavy resistance it met and the political instability the country faced. The programme had three 
main objectives: to improve the balance of payments, to counter inflation, and to create an 
export-oriented free market economy, replacing the policies of import substitution 
industrialization (ISI) that marked the preceding decades. To achieve these objectives, the 
government had a series of tools at its disposal: currency devaluation, increase of the interest 
rate, a general freeze of wages and a decrease of state sponsored subsidies. Simultaneously, the 
government attempted to stimulate foreign investments: tarriffs were banned, profit and capital 
repatriation was introduced, exemptions on import duties were provided and around the ports 
of İzmir, Mersin and Adana Free Trading Zones were established (Zürcher 1993: 315-317). Özal’s 
neoliberal ideas were clearly reflected in the policies he adopted. Parallel to the above-mentioned 
measures, he furthermore deregulated financial institutions, increased labor market flexibility, 
deregulated domestic markets for both capital and private goods, and privatized state assets. 
However, due to the fact that most state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were out of date and 
inefficient – making it difficult to find investors for them – the process of privatization went very 
slow (Zürcher 1993: 320).  
Although Özal’s reforms initially brought economic growth and prosperity, they were also the 
main reason for several economic crises, the most severe of which were the 1994 and 2000/2001 
crises, both of which I will briefly describe below. It is important to understand these crises, 
because they prepared the ground for more intensive neoliberal programs under the current AKP 
government. Furthermore, by understanding what caused them, we are able to evaluate the 
current government’s economic program much better. 
The 1994 crisis 
The 1994 crisis was a currency crisis and occurred mainly due to: (1) capital account convertibility 
without a proper regulatory framework; (2) prioritization of both firms and state actors on short-
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term gains; (3) an unstable and fragmented political landscape characterized by populism; (4) an 
inability to attract long-term foreign direct investments (FDI); and (5) an abrupt implementation 
of trade liberalization policies (Alper and Öniş 2003; Öniş 2004; Cizre and Yeldan 2005). Especially 
the combination of capital asset liberalization and the inability to attract long-term FDI proved 
toxic. By implementing capital account convertibility, the government hoped to attract large 
amounts of foreign investments in order to stimulate the economy. However, in doing so it 
underestimated the volatility and the accompanying destabilizing effects these financial flows 
have on domestic markets. It was hoping to attract long-term FDI but ended up stimulating the 
inflow of highly speculative short-term capital, for in order to attract FDI a stable environment 
together with a regulatory framework is necessary. As a result, the Turkish stock markets became 
highly vulnerable leading to a growing number of insolvencies. The response of the Turkish 
authorities was to issue a large quantity of government bonds with high interest rates – due to 
the country’s poor credit rating – to Turkish banks (i.e. increasing the money supply), causing 
inflation, which was exactly what the government wanted to avoid. Eventually, foreign investors 
lost faith in the Turkish Lira and started speculating on the currency markets, heavily devaluating 
it in the process. Completely crippled, the government had no choice but to file for an IMF loan.  
Despite the dire situation it was in, the Turkish economy quickly recovered and was already 
growing and attracting short-term capital a year later (Figure 1), demonstrated by a steep rise in 
the Central Bank’s foreign exchange reserves in 1995 and 1996 (Figure 2). The reason for the rapid 
recovery was partly due to the flexibility of the labor market and by redistributing income away 
from wage earners. However, some of the measures that were taken to reduce the impact of the 
crisis were based on short-term recovery instead of long-term growth, thereby postponing the 
negative effects and setting up the stage for a second crisis, one that would erupt in late 
2000/early 2001. 
 
Figure 1 – Inflation and GDP growth from 1990 to 2009 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, September 2011 
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The 2001 crisis 
There are a number of different factors that contributed to the eruption of the economic crisis of 
2001. First of all, the government proved unable to deter the negative effects of high volatility 
and risk associated with short-term capital as the economy was still highly dependent upon it. 
Therefore, in order to keep a positive net balance in short-term capital accumulation it had to 
encourage inflows and discourage outflows. To attain this goal, the government kept domestic 
interest rates high, but quickly accumulated domestic debt in the immediate pre-crisis years due 
to the fact it had a large budget deficit and a higher interest rate increased the burden of debt 
servicing (Öniş 2009). As such, its fiscal policies were undermining any chance of long-term 
recovery (Figure 3).  
Furthermore, to assure citizens and allow banks to recover rapidly, regulations were imposed on 
the banking sector. These included full insurance coverage for deposit accounts but created 
problems of moral hazard, as they were now a potential liability for the state (Isik and Hassan 
2003; Öniş 2009). 
 
 
Figure 2 – Central Bank’s Gross Foreign Exchange Reserves (Monthly, $ Millions)  
Source: Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey 
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Figure 3 – Consolidated Budget Deficit and Its Components (% of GNP) 
Third, in the late 1990s, Turkey continued to experience political instabilities due to various 
coalition governments and fragmented factionalism: from 1995 to 2000 five different coalition 
governments were formed, of which one was even ousted by the military in 1997 due to the 
Islamist leanings of one of the coalition parties. The instability of the political system forced these 
governments to focus on short-term gains as they were constantly focused on forthcoming 
elections and were stimulated to indulge in populist policies, largely to the detriment of 
sustainable development. In addition, governments were able to obscure their budgetary 
expenses due to Özal’s deregulation policies, which inevitably led to bribery and corruption, 
causing the country’s democratic deficit to exacerbate its budget deficit (Alper and Öniş 2003; 
Öniş 2009). 
Finally, there were external developments as well that negatively affected the Turkish economy, 
like the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 and the Argentine Great Depression of 1999-2002. It was 
especially the Russian Financial Crisis of 1997 that had a significant impact since Russia had 
become an important trading partner. All these factors combined made investors wary about the 
uncertainty that was facing the Turkish economy, making short-term capital even more volatile 
and speculative, exposing more risk on the economy (Özkan 2005; Öniş 2009).  
Due to the above, the IMF in 1999 warned for an impending financial crisis and came up with a 
new stabilization program which was keenly adopted by the Turkish Central Bank. The key 
elements of this program were: a strong exchange rate commitment; tight monetary control; a 
large fiscal adjustment to eliminate inflationary pressures; and a range of structural measures 
designed to liberalize the economy (Özkan 2005). Nonetheless, this proved unable to deter one 
of the most severe economic crises Turkey has ever faced. To get into too much detail in 
explaining how the crisis was ultimately triggered lies out of the scope of this paper, but the 
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official narrative of the government and popular media attributed the crisis to “the failure of the 
Turkish bureaucracy to implement the necessary structural adjustment reforms on time, thereby 
disturbing market agents and letting foreign capital to leave the country” (Yeldan 2006: 204). 
Since Turkey was basically bankrupt and had to file for an IMF care package, the conditions on 
which it could get such a loan was by structurally reforming the economy – the methodology of 
which has already been explained in the first chapter. Nonetheless, how much influence the IFIs 
actually had in this process is noteworthy due to the fact that after the crisis the vice chair of the 
World Bank, Kemal Derviş, became a Turkish Minister of State. According to his statement, “with 
the implementation of a more stringent fiscal policy, the crisis might perhaps have been 
alleviated. Unfortunately, the fiscal policy had not been strong enough, and the current account 
deficit widened.”8 However, as Yeldan (2006) shows, efforts were definitely made to close the 
account deficit due to the fact that both voters as well as politicians became aware of the negative 
consequences of short-term populist decisions that had ruled the country for a number of years, 
the so-called populist cycles (Alper and Öniş 2003). It was not that “the fiscal policy had not been 
strong enough”, but rather the erosion of the Central Bank’s ability to implement monetary policy 
effectively, namely controlling interest rates and exchange rates – due to the liberalization of the 
capital account and the exchange rate – as well as the reforms made under the stabilization 
program itself. All that was needed in an economic environment as fragile as this was an arbitrary 
event like a dispute between the PM and the President, provoking a run on the Turkish Lira on 
the 21st of February 2001 and causing overnight interest rates to soar at 6200 percent. This 
devaluated the Turkish Lira and caused inflation to rise, which was being met with an even 
stronger reaction by foreign investors to withdraw their capital, leaving banks short for cash. The 
remaining assets the banks held consisted of government bonds but they were unable to liquidate 
them due to the high budget deficit the government ran in combination with high interest rates. 
Without any liquidity, the Turkish economy slowed down and ultimately plunged into a financial 
crisis (Arı 2008).  
The AKP years 
It was during these troubled years that a newly formed party named the ‘Justice and Development 
Party’ (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP), led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, came to power after the 
elections of 2002. In stark contrast with the turbulent period that marked the 1990s, this 
newcomer was able to form a single party government, ending the period of numerous coalition 
governments. The AKP’s economic program basically continued along the same path of Kemal 
Derviş during the previous coalition government. This program was based on a new kind of 
economic logic, labelled the so-called ‘post-Washington consensus’ (PWC), a new paradigm that 
would become the official discourse of both the IMF and World Bank after the 2008 financial crisis. 
One of the key elements of this new paradigm is the fact that there is a more prominent role 
reserved for the state, a role that complements the market rather than being substituted by it. It 
emphasizes the need for regulation of the financial system to counter excessive risk-taking by 
undercapitalized banks. Furthermore, state support for improving infrastructure, education and 
                                                     
8 Panel presentation of Kemal Derviş, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey, 27 February 2002. 
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the transmission of technology are regarded as its responsibility, as well as promoting equality 
and alleviating poverty (Gore 2000; Öniş and Şenses 2005).  
Income distribution 
In accordance with both the PWC and its own Islamic values, the AKP actively engaged in reducing 
income disparity. However, it attempted to achieve this not through the formal state apparatus 
like subsidies, but by using informal mechanisms that involved its own political network and that 
of allied religious organizations. Necessarily this created a gap between citizens that were a 
member of the party or an allied religious organization – often Sunni muslim ones – and those 
that were not, impeding them from gaining acccess to state support. This worked to the AKP’s 
advantage in two ways. First, it forced citizens to join the party if they wanted to benefit from this 
advantage, both limiting the costs of the support while at the same time enlarging their popular 
base. Second, since these welfare programs were not payed for by taxpayers’ money but by 
private donations, it did not drain state resources and hence had no negative effect on economic 
activity and investments, which was also an important factor in attracting FDI (Öniş 2012). 
Privatization and foreign ownership 
The AKP also made serious efforts to accelerate the privatization process that was already 
underway since Özal. However, the AKP proved far more successful in its efforts – while previous 
governments faced strong opposition, the recent crisis helped to persuade citizens that 
privatization was necessary if the economy was to become more sustainable. Furthermore, as the 
only ruling party it was in a far better position to implement its privatization plans. That being 
said, it were mainly efficient and profitable SOEs that were being sold. Due to its powerful 
position, the AKP could carry this out without being met with too much opposition and therefore 
it was much easier to find investors willing to buy these companies. In the chart below (Figure 4) 
we can clearly see that from 2004 onwards privatization accelerated, roughly correlating with the 
inflow of FDI which indicates that much of these SOEs were sold to foreign investors (although 
some major Turkish banks and conglomerates were involved as well). Finally, the Foreign 
Investment Law that was passed in 2003 lifted the restrictions on foreign investors to acquire 
ownership of Turkish assets, making it much more attractive and lucrative to invest in the Turkish 
economy (Öniş 2011).  
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Figure 4 - Privatisation revenue and the inflow of FDI from 1985 to 2010 ($ million) 
Source: Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey 
Exports, exchange rate and purchasing power 
Simultaneously, we can observe a fivefold increase in national exports between 2001 and 2017 
(Figure 5). Nonetheless, imports have grown even more, resulting in a negative trade balance of 
76 billion USD, up from 10 billion USD in 2001. This is a clear indication that the Turkish economy 
has become more globalized in the past 16 years, firmly consolidating its position as a net 
importer. 
 
Figure 5 – Foreign Trade by years, 2001 - 2017 ($ Thousand) 
Source: Turkish Statistical Institute 
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As a net importer, it is absolutely vital that the economy maintains a strong currency in order to 
reduce the negative effects on its balance of payments and keep domestic prices stable. However, 
the currency exchange rate has gone up from 1.66 USD/TRY on January 2nd 2003 to 4.06 USD/TRY 
during the time of writing, April 6th 2018 (Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey). This is reflected 
in real domestic purchasing power. Figures 6 and 7 show the growth in GDP per capita and the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI), respectively, from 2003 to 2017-8. Although significant increases in 
per capita GDP of more than 100% are to be observed, this is more than being offset by a rise in 
CPI, which more than tripled. Thus, although GDP per capita did increase, real purchasing power 
decreased, leaving many relatively worse off than before the AKP-period. It needs to be noted in 
this regard that, although formally there has not been an increase in income disparity, the fact 
that real purchasing power for consumption goods has decreased actually increases purchasing 
power disparity. This is due to the fact that the lower one’s income is, the greater the proportion 
of one’s income that will be spent on consumption, thus higher consumer prices are mostly 
affecting those in the lower income categories. This is further exemplified by the substantial 
increase in housing prices, especially in the three large cities of Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir. In the 
period from 2011 - 2016 alone, housing prices in Istanbul nearly tripled and approximately 
doubled in Ankara and Izmir (Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey 20179), again causing a 
transfer of wealth from tenants to homeowners and making it more difficult to become a 
homeowner since interest rates have remained high (Figure 8). 
 
Figure 6 – Gross Domestic Product-Per capita GDP ($) (Annual)  
Source: Turkish Statistical Institute  
 
 
                                                     
9 House Price Index 2016, Statistics Department, Real Sector Data Division 
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Figure 7 – Consumer Price Index (CPI)-General (2003=100) (Yearly in January)   
Source: Turkish Statistical Institute 
 
Figure 8 – House Price Indices (HPI) for Three Large Cities (2010=100, Quarterly)   
Source: Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey 
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Conclusion 
Turkey has witnessed a number of neoliberal reform periods from the 1980s onwards, every 
government contributing its own share. These reforms have culminated in two economic crises 
and were partly responsible for the AKP’s political power. Although the AKP carried out these 
reforms more thoroughly, it essentially did not deviate from the IMF-based program set out by 
Derviş. As a consequence of these reforms privatization intensified; foreign investments 
increased; foreign imports increased, further negatively affecting the trade balance; GDP per 
capita increased but is set off by a greater increase in CPI due to a devaluation of the currency; 
purchasing power disparity increased; and housing prices went up. These indicators show that the 
path the Turkish economy is heading for is not sustainable. The value of the Turkish Lira is 
deteriorating day by day, which is reflected in the prices of consumer goods. This heavily erodes 
the growth in GDP, although GDP per capita has decreased as well in recent years. Finally, this 
development is mostly affecting those in the lower income segments, non-homeowners and 
homeowners alike. If prices continue to rise, homeowners will be forced to sell their homes in 
order to meet their payments, causing a crash in the housing market which will plunge the 
economy into a recession. Like always, this will cause another transfer of wealth from the lower 
income segments to those owning capital. 
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3. The Egyptian Case: Extension and Contraction of Social 
Provisions 
 
Egypt’s encounter with economic reforms starts in 1974 with the implementation of Law 43/1974 
(Law for Arab and Foreign Investments and Free Zones) under President Anwar Sadat. It was 
aimed at opening up the Egyptian economy, a strategy referred to as infitah, in order to attract 
foreign resources. The reforms consisted of diminishing state intervention in the market, tax 
exemptions for foreign companies, and abolishing the requirement that foreign companies need 
to be partly owned by an Egyptian partner (Brownlee 2011). However, it would take until the 1988 
debt crisis under Mubarak to fully implement these reforms and others which have made them 
earn the title of neoliberal. 
Nasser’s social reforms 
This marked a clear divergence from the pan-Arab nationalism of the Nasser era, which started 
with the overthrow of the monarch King Farouk in 1952, an event also known as the Free Officers 
coup. Being the leader of the Free Officers, Gamal Abdel Nasser’s main aim was for Egyptians to 
regain both their political and economic sovereignty by substituting foreign investments with 
Egyptian investments, both private and public. In 1956 he became president and by nationalizing 
foreign and domestic firms and banks and engaging in ISI, he was able to create substantial 
economic growth, averaging 7 percent annually between 1955 and 1965 (Ikram 2006: 85-88). 
Nasser was able to implement his ideas due to the fact that he had garnered widespread popular 
support through his handling of the Suez crisis, the creation of the United Arab Republic jointly 
with Syria and his welfare programs targeting poverty (Roccu 2012: 103-105). Initially Nasser’s 
policies were essentially socialist since he reconfigured class structures and made them more 
equal. This is exemplified through his land reforms where he nationalized enormous swaths of 
land and redistributed them to landless farmers, making the ownership of land more equal (Baker 
1978; Bush 1998; Hanieh 2013). However, later on his policy changed. As Egypt became severely 
indebted he needed to build a national capitalist class that was comprised of Egyptians instead of 
foreigners. Furthermore, this new capitalist class came to be constituted more and more by state 
elites, both military and bureaucrats rather than by private businessmen, creating a so-called 
‘state bourgeoisie’ (Zaalouk 1989) or ‘state class’ (Ayubi 1996). Therefore, his policies of later 
years also came to be known as ‘state capitalism’ (Cooper 2013) and were marked by some 
concessions to the benefit of national elites. Nonetheless, since he heavily promoted Egyptian 
pride and nationalism and emphasized Egyptian independence from foreign powers he kept 
enjoying widespread popularity, despite the dissolution of the United Arab Republic and the 
defeat in the Six-Day War against Israel, and remained to do so until his death in 1970.  
Sadat’s infitah 
With Nasser’s death a new era of modernization took place in Egypt under the leadership of 
Anwar Sadat. Although capitalist development was already underway during Nasser’s final years 
of presidency, Sadat reopened the economy to foreign investments. The logic behind his policy 
was that by acquiring access to Western technology, attracting Arab investments derived from 
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petrodollars, and employing the Egyptian labor force both at home and in the Gulf countries, 
consumption would be increased and revenues through remittances would be raised (Cooper 
2013). Like mentioned above, Law 43 marked the beginning of infitah. The law enabled “the 
creation of tax-free zones, the establishment of much greater foreign exchange freedom also for 
companies operating outside of the free zones, and the provision of explicit protection for new 
investors” (Roccu 2012: 106). However, the implemented policies did not have the desired effect. 
Although a considerable number of projects were approved, they either did not materialize or 
they focused on non-productive sectors such as construction, tourism and housing (Baker 1978: 
145). Furthermore, other than some international oil companies and banks it failed in attracting 
the hoped-for Arab and Western investments. Nonetheless, in the period between 1975 and 1985 
Egypt witnessed the highest economic growth in its modern history, averaging an annual growth 
rate of 8 percent. This was due to the fact that Egypt’s economic ‘opening’ was accompanied with 
its political ‘opening’, i.e. a more friendly approach to the West, mainly the United States. In light 
of this new orientation towards the West, Egypt normalized its relations with Israel and eventually 
signed the Camp David Accords in September 1978, ending the hostilities between the two 
countries. In return, Egypt was awarded with a significant increase in foreign aid, ranking it as the 
largest foreign aid receiver, a title it still holds today. The vast amount of aid it was able to garner 
resulted in the emergence of a mass consumption society, considered to be the hallmark of 
Sadat’s presidency (Amin 1995; Shechter 2008). Despite the inflow of so much foreign aid and the 
accompanying economic growth it spurred, it did not increase employment, nor was it sustainable 
since the growth was mainly based on debt and the country faced a serious deficit on its balance 
of payments (Radwan 1998; Roccu 2012). Due to the risk of becoming insolvent, it had to file for 
more loans from the IMF, which it was granted under a number of conditions that were supposed 
to open up the economy further and also forced it to cut back on spending, including cutting down 
on subsidies of basic food stock. Since many citizens were dependent upon these subsidies to 
support themselves, they flocked onto the streets to protest these measures. The government 
had to back down eventually, but this was only temporary since the cutbacks on food supply 
continued in the next decades, albeit very gradually (Ayubi 1995; Amin 1999). The most important 
aspects of Sadat’s infitah however, were twofold. First, it sought to incorporate Egypt into the 
structure of global hierarchies and thus made it subordinate to US interests (Maher 2011: 33; 
Hanieh 2013). Second, it made an initial effort to create a new capitalist business class, alongside 
the military and state bureaucracy. At the same time, the public sector expanded significantly, 
making both state capitalists and the new ‘business bourgeoisie’ rely heavily on the state for their 
survival (Sadowski 1991: 138-140; Ayubi 1995; Bush 1999: 89-99). In this regard Egypt remained 
very much statist, as the private sector only made up 10 percent of the assets of the public sector 
(Ayubi 1995: 349). It would take another few decades for the private sector to become a full-
fledged member in the game of capital accumulation. 
Mubarak’s counter-reforms 
After the assassination of Anwar Sadat on the 6th of October 1981 by a member of the Egyptian 
Islamic Jihad, Hosni Mubarak took office, becoming the 4th president of Egypt. The first decade of 
his tenure his economic policy continued more or less along the same line as that of Sadat. The 
conditions that were imposed on the IMF loan that was granted during Sadat’s final year in office 
did not materialize and as such Egypt’s budget deficit increased during Mubarak’s initial years. 
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This resulted in the 1988 debt crisis and by 1990 the financial situation had become untenable, 
forcing the government to file for a new IMF loan. It was granted the loan, but in return Egypt was 
to implement a thorough neoliberal program according to the Washington Consensus: an 
Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program (ERSAP). ERSAP contained the usual 
monetary and fiscal policies and was aimed to first stabilize the economy and national finances 
and second to implement economic reforms (Roccu 2012). To achieve this goal, the government 
was “to cut spending on social services, relax price controls, cut subsidies, deregulate and privatize 
industries, target inflation, and liberalize capital flows” (Maher 2011: 33). This would be the start 
of the true neoliberal turn in Egypt, having major implications on both power and economic 
relations in society as well as on its configuration within the global system of capital accumulation 
(Maher 2011; Roccu 2012; Hanieh 2013). 
In accordance with ERSAP, the initial years focused mainly on fiscal discipline and the increasing 
budget deficit. In this regard the program proved successful: the budget deficit declined from 15.3 
percent in 1991 to 1.3 percent in 1996 (Subramanian 1997). This was further positively affected 
by such measures as the unification of the exchange rate and also the remission of a part of its 
debt obligations by the Paris Club10 (Ikram 2007). Furthermore, in order to tackle inflation the 
Central Bank of Egypt became more independent, disabling the government’s ability to indulge in 
monetary expansion. This had a significant impact, as inflation dropped from an annual average 
of approximately 19 percent in the 1987-1991 period to 4.6 percent in 1997 (Zaki 2001: 1873). 
Indeed, Egypt’s economic climate looked bright, as real GDP grew at an annual rate of around 5 
percent in the initial years of the ERSAP (Abdel-Khalek 2001: 60).  
However, during these initial stages the foundations were laid to implement an all-out neoliberal 
program on the Egyptian economy in the following years. Like neoliberal programs elsewhere, 
they were to have a significant implication on the standard of living of many Egyptians, causing a 
reversal of the many social reforms that were made during Nasser’s presidency. In this section I 
will highlight two policies which had the most visible impact: agricultural reform and privatization.  
Agricultural reforms 
Although attempts were already made to reform the agricultural sector in the 1980s (Sadowski 
1991: 144-154), it was not until Law 96 was passed in 1992 that significantly altered the structure 
of land ownership in Egypt. Law 96 consisted of three components. For a five-year transitional 
period rent was revised from 7 to 22 times the land tax and would be completely liberalized 
afterwards. Second, owners were allowed to buy back their lands and after the transitional phase 
the contracts could only be renewed for a maximum amount of 12 months, whereas in Nasser’s 
reforms land tenancy was inheritable and as long as tenants were able to pay their rents their 
                                                     
10 "The Paris Club is an informal group of official creditors whose role is to find coordinated and 
sustainable solutions to the payment difficulties experienced by debtor countries. As debtor countries 
undertake reforms to stabilize and restore their macroeconomic and financial situation, Paris Club 
creditors provide an appropriate debt treatment. Paris Club creditors provide debt treatments to debtor 
countries in the form of rescheduling, which is debt relief by postponement or, in the case of concessional 
rescheduling, reduction in debt service obligations during a defined period (flow treatment) or as of a set 
date (stock treatment).” From the Paris Club website: http://www.clubdeparis.org/. Accessed April 27th 
2018. 
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contracts were valid indefinitely. Lastly, the owner got the right to evict tenants from his land if 
he wanted to sell it and there was no agreement between the two (Bush 1999: 46; Saad 2002: 
120; Roccu 2012: 119).  
I hope that some people would not think that the purpose of this law is to give 
the landlords a sword to hit the tenants’ neck with, for the law has come to 
achieve balance and justice between the two parties. We should not forget 
that we are a compassionate and supportive society, that it is inconceivable 
that an owner would expel a tenant just because a law was issued. (Prime 
Minister Atef Sidki on the closing of the parliamentary debate confirming Law 
96 of 1992. Saad 2002: 103) 
However, this is exactly what happened. Not only was land taken away from small and medium 
tenants and given to large landholders, small landholders were also forced to sell their lands as 
the government withdrew from the sector and smaller farms were unable to compete with large 
ones. As a result, by 2000 landholding had become more unequal than before 1952 with 0.05 
percent of total holders accounting for 11 percent of the total landholding area (Ministry of 
Agriculture and Land Reclamation 2000). In the same period, 700 thousand farmers lost their job 
and almost a million were evicted from their land (Mitchell 2002: 265), not to mention the more 
than 800 tenants that got killed and the 7000 that were detained when objecting against the land 
reform (Roccu 2012: 120). This massive deprivation of land contributed significantly to the 
urbanization and the proletarianization of society, and together with a deregulation of the labor 
market caused the price of unskilled labor to plunge (Hanieh 2013). 
Privatization 
The proletarianization process and the deregulation of the labor market was aimed to accelerate 
privatization. The logic of the IFIs that promoted this process was that it would become more 
attractive to invest in the private sector if wages were lowered and social protection measures 
were rolled back as much as possible. The privatization process can be divided in two phases. The 
first phase was from 1988 to 1999 and was aimed at selling off profitable companies in non-
strategic sectors. In line with ERSAP Law 203 was passed in 1991, designating 314 public sectors 
for sale, most of them manufacturing companies and total privatization revenues in this period 
totaled 4,172 million USD. After this initial phase privatization decelerated a bit, coming to a halt 
in 2002 and 2003, after which it started off again in 2004, reaching its peak of 7,583 million USD 
in 2006. The main difference between these two phases, apart from the value of the assets that 
were divested, is the fact that privatization also moved into sectors that were considered as 
strategic, like telecommunications and finance – the largest two SOEs that were privatized were 
from these two sectors (Roccu 2012: 120-122; Hanieh 2013: 50-52). 
Economic growth and living standards 
Due to the reforms mentioned above, the World Bank recognized Egypt as the region’s top 
reformer in three consecutive years from 2006 to 2008 and even the world’s top reformer in 2008. 
Not surprisingly, when looking at Figure 9 below we can see that GDP per capita in the 1990-2016 
period nearly doubled – from 1560 USD to 2724 USD. At the same time, however, a significant 
increase in poverty is to be observed. The national poverty headcount ratio is the percentage of 
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the population living below the national poverty line. When counting from the first year when this 
data is present it is to be observed that the percentage of people below the poverty line also 
nearly doubled – from 16.7 percent in 1999 to 27.8 percent in 2015. Simultaneously, 
unemployment has remained high fluctuating between 8 and 13 percent in the 1990-2016 period 
and has been even higher among youth peaking at 34.4 percent in 2012, but already as high as 
24.9 percent in 2010, the year before the Arab Spring11. 
 
Figure 9 – GDP per capita for the Arab Republic of Egypt (constant 2010 US$)  
Source: World Bank database 
 
Figure 10 – Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (% of population) for the 
Arab Republic of Egypt 
Source: World Bank database 
                                                     
11 World Bank database: https://data.worldbank.org/. Accessed April 22, 2018. 
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Conclusion 
Although Egypt slowly opened up to the word economy in the post-Nasser years with Sadat’s 
infitah, it was not until the 1990s with Mubarak that we can see a clear shift towards neoliberal 
policies. These policies have been mostly notable through the land reforms and privatization. 
However, labor market deregulation, trade liberalization, cutting of subsidies and social 
provisions, and the creation of tax-free zones can also be categorized under this banner. All these 
measures have reformed the Egyptian economy indeed, making it financially healthier and have 
generated immense wealth for the country. At the same time however, Egyptian society has 
become less equal, with wealth concentrated in the hands of a happy few, causing poverty and 
unemployment to rise substantially and leaving a growing proportion of society worse off. More 
than that, they have transformed the Egyptian state in a conduit of wealth that can be utilized for 
private benefits the closer one is to the center of power. It is this power dimension of the state 
and its transformation that will be the subject of the next chapter. 
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4. The Configurations of Power in the Neoliberal State 
 
The policies that have been described in the previous chapters were met with severe protests in 
both countries. The protests included large-scale demonstrations, labor strikes and student 
protests – the most prominent being the Arab Spring and the Gezi Park protests – and a 
reconfiguration of opposition movements. As a response to this resistance the state had to step 
up its security apparatus if it wanted to implement its neoliberal reforms successfully (Hanieh 
2013: 64). In both Turkey and Egypt this has led to an authoritarian regime that has become more 
oppressive ever since. In this chapter I will outline how state power has been reconstructed and 
how this has influenced democratic institutions – starting first by examining democratic 
regression in Turkey, and thereafter observing the consolidation of autocratic power in Egypt. For 
Turkey I will investigate the media, since Turkey enjoyed a relative amount of press freedom 
before the situation deteriorated significantly. For Egypt on the other hand I will examine the 
process of agricultural reforms and privatization – the process of which also illustrates well how 
political power has become intertwined with private sector interests. Since the objective of this 
chapter is not to present a comparison for each country according to specific sectors or processes 
but rather illustrating how in both countries power has been reconstructed due to neoliberal 
policies, I have picked those cases that best exemplify this process. Due to the specificities per 
country this necessarily creates variation in the sectors under scrutiny. 
Democratic retrogression in Turkey 
When the AKP first came to power in 2002, it promised that it would make Turkey more 
democratic, curb the power of the military and liberalize religious freedoms. Although it made 
some progress in this regard – passing legislation to protect media freedoms, lifting the headscarf 
ban, neutralizing the political role of the military and implementing anti-corruption laws – it 
started to alter its course after its reelection in 2007. After the consolidation of its power in that 
same year, the AKP  – under the leadership of then PM Erdoğan – started to assert itself more and 
more as an authoritarian party. This is illustrated through its attacks on the media, the extension 
and incorporation of the military and its security apparatus, its attacks on judicial impartiality, its 
imposition of religious education to transform the youth, and its numerous violations of the 
constitution to keep itself in power – to name just a few (Keyman 2010; Akser and Baybars-Hawks 
2012; Kaya 2015; Akkoyunlu and Öktem 2016; Lüküslü 2016; Öktem and Akkoyunlu 2016; Öztürk 
2016; Somer 2016; White and Herzog 2016). The number of inmates has never been this high – 
from 49,512 (or 0.073% of the total population) in 2000 to 200,339 (or 0.251%) in 2016 – even 
exceeding the levels during the military dictatorship at the beginning of the 1980s.12 
According to White and Herzog (2016), Turkey should be labelled as ‘electoral authoritarian’, 
instead of a variant of democracy. In such a system multi-party elections may still take place “but 
liberal-democratic principles of freedom and fairness are violated to such a degree as to neutralize 
the democratic nature of such elections, effectively making them instruments of authoritarian 
rule” (White and Herzog 2016: 554). The overall goal of such a regime is to “reap the fruits of 
                                                     
12 http://www.prisonstudies.org/country/turkey. 
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electoral legitimacy without running the risks of democratic uncertainty” (Schedler 2002: 37). This 
is exactly what happened with the elections of June 2015, where the AKP lost its absolute majority 
in parliament and had to form a coalition government. The AKP’s ‘defeat’ was caused by a rise in 
popularity of the Kurdish-led left-leaning HDP (Halkların Demokratik Partisi, The Peoples’ 
Democracy Party), which was able to undermine AKP political dominance effectively. However, 
immediately after the disappointing election results, the AKP aborted peace talks with the Kurdish 
terror organization PKK and re-engaged in military operations against it while simultaneously 
trying to affiliate it with the HDP. For the first time in Turkish electoral history since 1950 the 
winner of the elections refused to form a government and stalled the process for 6 months, after 
which, according to Turkish law, voters had to return to the ballot box and vote again. With a full-
scale media campaign aimed at undermining HDP credibility – utilizing Turkish national symbolism 
and all the rhetoric of war and national security – and the detainment of some of its most 
prominent members on the grounds of supporting terrorism, 6 months later the AKP was able to 
alter the election results in its own favor; once again it was able to rule the country with an 
absolute majority in parliament (Öktem and Akkoyunlu 2016; White and Herzog 2016). Since the 
role of the media has been critical in this process, it deserves to be examined in more detail. 
The media 
Turkey ranked 149th out of 180 countries included in the Reporters Without Borders’ World Press 
Freedom Index (Transparency International 2018). “This is part of a worrying trend in Turkey 
where the government is moving towards autocratic rule. These actions threaten the very 
foundations of democracy”.13 Although the profession of journalism in Turkey has never been 
without danger, the AKP has stepped up the state’s autocratic stance towards the media since 
2007; including pressurizing the Doğan Media Group, tapping phones of political figures, arresting 
journalists – first in the Ergenekon trials and later in its fight against the so-called Gülen Terror 
Organization (FETÖ) – excluding non-aligned reporters from political circles and banning foreign 
media websites like the Dutch National Broadcast Agency (NOS) and Wikipedia (Akser and 
Baybars-Hawks 2012).  
With the ascension of Özal’s presidency Turkish media became more sensationalist since they 
were more motivated by profit rather than journalistic ideals, a process that accelerated well into 
the 1990s when large conglomerates started acquiring media outlets (Kaya 1994; Adaklı 2009; 
Sönmez 2010). These business groups – through their alliances with political elites – were able to 
increase their economic interests at the expense of full press freedom and the position of the 
labor unions for journalists (Finkel 2000; Tilic 2000; Tunç 2003). Nonetheless, in the 1999-2005 
period – which corresponds roughly with the acceptation of its EU membership candidacy until 
the launch of accession talks – Turkey made some remarkable progress in transforming its 
legislature regarding the media, although it did not culminate in a paradigmatic shift in practice 
(Sümer 2007; Akser and Baybars-Hawks 2012).  
                                                     
13 José Ugaz, Chair of Transparency International, 
https://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/transparency_international_condemns_forced_takeov
er_of_media_organisations. 
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In the aftermath of the 2001 economic crisis – parallel to the banking sector – Turkey’s media 
sector underwent restructuring, regarding the fact that the companies in this sector were 
sometimes owned by the same holding company. The media assets of these holding companies 
were taken over by the newly established Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (Tasarruf Mevduatı 
Sigorta Fonu, TMSF) and were later sold to conglomerates already active in the media sector or 
by new groups that were just entering it. Within this context, the AKP actively tried to benefit its 
affiliated business circles to own media outlets; the case of the Uzan family’s media empire is an 
illustrative example of how media ownership changed hands from opposition to government-
friendly groups (Bora 2002; Akın 2010; Akser and Baybars-Hawks 2012).  
The picture that arises today is one of large conglomerates that are economically tied to the 
political elite in a number of different ways. All the large media groups – Turkuvaz Medya Grubu, 
Doğan Holding, Doğuş Holding – have subsidiaries that are active in infrastructural projects in both 
the energy and construction sector, both of which are sectors that rely heavily on government 
permits and tenders to gain approval for projects.14 At the same time we can observe that there 
has been an erosion of Turkish democratic institutions and an increasing prevalence of corruption 
(Bedirhanoğlu 2007). Transparency International scored Turkey 40/100 in 2017 in their Corruption 
Perception Index, down from 50/100 in 2013. This is further exemplified by the fact that the 
privatization process has almost entirely been dominated by business elites that have strong ties 
to the political elite.15 Thus, in order to survive these large holding companies have to be careful 
about being too critical about the government. Adding the fact that since the attempted coup on 
July 15th 2016 Turkey has officially been in a state of emergency, and thus media outlets are to 
conform to a strict discourse in their coverage of news items, it is very unlikely that there can be 
any kind of critical media in such an environment. 
Autocratic consolidation in Egypt 
In 2008 Egypt employed an estimated 1.7 million security personnel and support staff, relatively 
similar to what East Germany used to allocate for internal monitoring (Brownlee 2011: 641). From 
1992 to 2011, the prison population rate went up from 0.058 percent to 0.083 percent.16 Egypt 
differs from Turkey in that it has never become fully democratic. Therefore, it would be wrong to 
talk about a rise in authoritarianism in Egypt, but rather about a consolidation of autocratic power 
and an alteration in the structure of this power. Nonetheless, it is possible to witness a slight 
political liberalization during Sadat’s infitah with the introduction of limited multiparty polls in 
1976, which was followed by a “relative expansion of liberties in the early 1980s” until this process 
was reversed by the end of the decade and Egypt became even more authoritarian than before, 
implementing repressive legislation against trade unions and syndicates, and witnessed 
unprecedented electoral fraud. Since the assassination of Sadat, “Egypt has been under a 
continuous State of Emergency, which has permitted the Egyptian state apparatus to engage in 
massive and often systemic labor rights violations, while torturing and even murdering regime 
critics” (Maher 2011: 37). This period coincided roughly with the 1988 debt crisis and the 
                                                     
14 See http://mulksuzlestirme.org/turkey-media-ownership-network/. 
15 http://mulksuzlestirme.org/energy-privization-network/. 
16 http://www.prisonstudies.org/country/egypt. 
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implementation of neoliberal reforms (Kienle 1998: 220; Roccu 2012). It were these reforms that 
have shaped contemporary Egyptian society and have configured power relations within the 
state. In line with the chapter on Egypt’s neoliberal experience, in this section I will map out the 
political implications of both the agricultural reforms and the privatization process. 
Agricultural reforms 
As has already been mentioned, Law 96 had significant economic consequences, rolling back 
Nasser’s reforms and causing a vast transfer of wealth from the poorer sections of the rural 
population to large landlords. Simultaneously with the transfer of this wealth however, there was 
also a transfer of political power. Nasser had decreed that half of the seats of parliament were to 
be hold by the lower classes and two seats in each electoral district were reserved for either an 
industrial worker or a peasant and by a professional or an official. Although this edict is still in 
force today, the parliament that approved Law 96 did not contain a single tenant, allowing 
landlords to present the issue according to their own perspective and interests (Saad 2002: 106; 
Roccu 2012: 133). Furthermore, the regime chose to downsize the Principal Bank for Development 
and Agricultural Credit (PBDAC) – which was responsible for providing credit for agricultural 
production – and to liberalize prices for credit as well as to eliminate subsidies on agricultural 
input (Bush 1999: 34). This benefitted the capitalist classes in two ways. First, with the reduction 
of the role of the state in providing credit to farmers, the cost of obtaining loans that are essential 
for investment rose and could only be obtained by those with the economic means, benefitting 
the landed elite as a large part of their competition was being eliminated. Second, the tasks that 
were previously performed by the state – the provision of credit and other banking services for 
the agricultural sector – were delegated increasingly to “members of the wider ruling bloc in their 
private capacity” (Roccu 2012: 136). Thus, a select group of businessmen with close ties to the 
political regime were able to benefit substantially at the expense of lower and middle classes.  
Privatization 
Something similar is to be observed with regard to the privatization process. According to both 
the IFIs and the government, like mentioned before, the inefficient and bureaucratic SOEs had to 
be replaced with efficient and competitive private firms which would ultimately benefit the whole 
of society. What actually took place however, was that SOEs were sold to those private groups 
that were created in the infitah reforms and had been loyal to the regime. As such, the state did 
not lose control over them as they were informally still tied to the state bureaucracy. 
Furthermore, the market did not open up to competition, but rather changed from being 
dominated by a state-run monopoly to either a private one or an oligopoly. Neither did they have 
an incentive to become competitive as long as they were dominating the national market. 
Furthermore, with the creation of designated tax-free zones, which were officially for a period of 
ten years but could technically continue perpetually, the state did not derive any revenue from 
economic activity, while at the same time many SOEs were sold below market value. Lastly, adding 
the fact that subsidies on consumption were cut and prices were liberalized, the state became a 
conduit of wealth for the capitalist class, both statist and private, causing the deterioration of 
living standards of the working class (Mitchell 2002: 282-283; Roll 2010: 358-359; Roccu 2012: 
120-122). 
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Conclusion 
In correlation with the implementation of neoliberal reforms since the 1980s the configurations 
of power within the state have altered significantly. Although both the Turkish and the Egyptian 
state have become authoritarian, what is remarkable in this regard are not the similarities 
regarding the extent of their authoritarianism, but rather regarding their nature. With the 
liberalization of markets and the retreat of the state from public provisions, powerful business 
and political elites have grasped this opportunity to obtain both economic as well as political 
dominance. In this respect the presence of the state did not diminish nor did private interests 
overcome political ones. What has changed however, has been the proliferation of business 
interests within state structures, creating a complex network that ties the private sector to the 
ruling classes. Thus, the state has become an arena in which the interests of these networks are 
being pursued, thereby altering its function from that of safeguarding the interests of its citizens 
to that of furthering the interests of those that are closest to power.  
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5. The Islamist Reaction 
 
The retreat of the state as a provider of public services and social security caused resentment 
among the population and made it to question its legitimacy. This came to expression in a number 
of different ways from a wide array of different political movements, the most successful of which 
have been the religious right, or those of the political Islamists. They have been able to use the 
neoliberal reforms to advance their own political agenda, incorporating them into their own 
narrative. In both Turkey and Egypt it has been the same current of political Islam – pro-business 
Sunni – that has been able to garner political power and has vested itself as a societal force to be 
reckoned with, firmly positioning itself at the heart of society. At the same time however, these 
groups were not constituted of lower-class laborers, but rather of educated upper-middle-class 
businessmen. Indeed, the political agenda of both the AKP and the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) has 
been neoliberal, or at least pro-capitalist. But if their political views have been supportive of these 
reforms then how were they able to garner popular support by utilizing the resentment against 
these very same measures?  
From a bottom-up cultural revolution… 
Apart from the fact that the Egyptian government’s economic policy deprived many citizens from 
a basic means of living, it was also its political orientation towards the West that alienated a large 
part of its population. Due to the fact that Egypt became incorporated into the global network of 
capital accumulation and became dependent on US economical support, it could not afford to 
challenge its patron politically and the rift between the state and its subjects started to get wider. 
Mainly the peace with Israel following the Camp David accords caused widespread resentment 
among the population (Berman 2003). It was within this context that religious organizations – 
mainly the Muslim Brotherhood – started filling the vacuum that was left by the state. Although 
they were officially banned as a political party, they provided citizens help with employment, 
education, housing, and health care, which made them gain popularity and support from the 
public. In short, they constituted the bulk of civil society. However, along with all this aid and 
support came a political message: “Islam is the way” (Ibid: 261). It was precisely because of this 
situation however that the Egyptian government was unable to counter this movement. Not only 
would it cut a growing number of people that were dependent on them from access to basic 
human provisions, but the secularly-oriented Egyptian state would run the risk of losing even 
more support and legitimacy if it openly opposed Islamic organizations (Anderson 1997; Murphy 
2002; Berman 2003). Thus, with a growing power base, the Islamist movement manifested itself 
as a political voice that could no longer be ignored. “In short, while the Islamist movement has 
not been able to topple the Egyptian state, it has contributed to isolating it still further from its 
people and transforming the country’s society and culture to such a degree that some scholars 
refer to what has occurred as the ‘Islamization of society’ or a ‘cultural revolution’” (Berman 2003: 
263). As Abdo describes it, “[a nation] long considered an outpost of democracy and secularism 
in the Arab world is quietly being transformed into an Islamic order” (2000: 12). In 2011 this 
discontent culminated in the ousting of Mubarak and the election of Mohamed Morsi – the leader 
of the Muslim Brotherhood – as president in the event we all know too well as the Arab Spring. 
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However, his reign was soon put to an end by the Egyptian military headed by its Commander-in-
Chief Abdel Fattah el-Sisi as it took over through a coup d’état and is still in charge of the 
government. Thus, what Berman already noted in 2003 still holds today: “state failure preceded 
the revolutionary challenge; …the state has not collapsed; and … the revolutionary movement has 
managed to effect a profound social and cultural transformation nonetheless” (Berman 2003: 
264). The situation has produced a stale-mate in which the state is the holder of political power 
and military force but has delegated its legitimacy and credibility to opposition movements. The 
revolution has been accomplished only in the domain of civil society, transforming it from the 
bottom up by spreading the political message through grass-roots organizations.  
…to a top-down political implementation 
Exactly the opposite has happened in Turkey, where it was not civil society that was altered, but 
the state itself. Since the outcomes of power contestation in Turkey remain dependent on 
elections, the seated government could be directly challenged and replaced through the ballot 
box. Therefore, no cultural revolution had to take place from the bottom up to alter politics. In 
fact, when the AKP came to power in 2002 it described itself as “moderately Islamist”, 
emphasizing that Turkey should be more inclusive, a country for everyone regardless of religious 
preference or ethnic background (Keyman 2010; Kaya 2015). Since its foundation in 1923 Turkey 
has been run by very distinct but all outspokenly secular governments. Unfortunately, these 
governments had been unable to realize neither a full-fledged democracy nor sustained economic 
development. The crises of the late 1990s and early 2000s however created an opening for a 
“moderately Islamist” party with a fresh look on the status quo, promising to both democratize 
the country as well as economically develop it. Like already mentioned above, the AKP’s main 
point of departure in this regard was the lift of the headscarf ban in public buildings, making 
universities and workplaces accessible for women wearing a headscarf. However, during its 
tenure it slowly but steadily made steps to Islamize society. When running the numbers, between 
2005 and 2015 the number of mosques in Turkey increased with nearly 9,000 to 90,000 in total – 
or one mosque for every 866 people. In comparison, for Egypt the ratio is approximately 1 to 
1,340 while for the Islamic republic of Iran the number is just one mosque for every 1,625 
citizens.17 Furthermore, in the period between 2002 and 2016 the number of students enrolled at 
religious schools (İmam Hatip) increased from 60,000 to 1.2 million.18 This has been a direct 
consequence of educational reforms the AKP has implemented. It turned the religious schools 
from a selective option into a central component of the educational system – making the 
recognition of its degrees equal to those of secular schools and introducing entrance 
examinations for all high schools except for the religious ones (Cornell 2015). This trend continues; 
as recently as last year (2017) Darwin’s theory of evolution was scrapped from the standard high 
school curriculum, while students are being set to discuss problems regarding the implementation 
                                                     
17 Based on numbers provided by Gatestone Institute: https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/9002/turkey-
mosques-prisons. Accessed May 4th 2018.  
18 Idem.  
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of democracy.19 In recent years however, especially since the attempted coup, nationalism has 
been added to this new discourse of state ideology – dubbed as ‘Turkishness’. 
[T]he AKP’s education and youth policies can be characterized by their dual 
nature: On the one side, they are infused with social conservatism and 
religious discourse, including an Islamized version of Turkish nationalism, 
which creates the image of a unified Turkey, where religious identity trumps 
class and ethnicity. On the other side, neoliberal economic policies deepen 
social inequalities and create conditions of severely unequal access to 
education. They aim at the imposition of a new national identity based on 
Islamic symbols and an Islamized historical narrative with symbolic dates and 
events that are untainted by the Kemalist history narrative. (Lüküslü 2016: 
645) 
It needs to be added here that the Islamic symbols that are being used are outspokenly Sunni. In 
other words, being Turkish is being equated with being nationalist and a pious Sunni Muslim. A 
complication that arises with this new narrative of national identity however, is the fact that an 
estimated 12 million20 Turkish citizens are not Sunni Muslim but are Alevi, not counting the fact 
that according to a 2017 poll 14 percent of the population – comprising both Sunni and Alevi 
backgrounds – does not consider itself Muslim at all21 (Kaya 2015; Lüküslü 2016; Öztürk 2016). 
Thus, a divide is created between those that adhere to this crafted official identity and those that 
do not. 
Conclusion 
The Islamization of Egyptian and Turkish society has been a direct result of the economic policies 
both countries have implemented in recent decades. Although other factors have no doubt made 
a contribution to this process as well – like the spread and funding of Islamic organizations by the 
wealthy Gulf States, mainly Saudi Arabia and Qatar – it has been the economic deprivation of large 
parts of society that has created an opportunity for political Islam to openly challenge the 
traditionally secular state elite. In both countries the secular state has failed to meet expectations 
and both the MB and the AKP have been successful in constructing a narrative that has been able 
to garner popular support by incorporating the economic hardships into their own ideology, 
formulating an alternative to the peoples’ sorrows – albeit a false one. The main difference 
between the MB and the AKP is the fact that for the MB this has not resulted in yielding political 
power. Being denied any participation in the political process, the only way for the MB to contest 
the state has been by transforming Egyptian society from the bottom up and isolating the 
government from its citizens. For the AKP however, the path to political power was hurdle-ridden 
but open, and so it did not have to transform society to walk it. What remains remarkable though 
                                                     
19 Milliyet newspaper from January 14th 2017: www.milliyet.com.tr/evrim-ve-darwin-derslerden-cikiyor-
gundem-2378271/. Accessed May 4th 2018. 
20 https://www.haberler.com/chp-li-ozbolat-ulke-genelinde-12-milyon-521-bin-5732812-haberi/. 
Accessed May 4th 2018.  
21 Yeni Çağı newspaper: http://www.yenicaggazetesi.com.tr/iktidara-yakin-anket-sirketi-halifeligi-sordu-
43225yy.htm. Accessed May 4th 2018. 
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is the fact that both movements are pro-capitalist in nature and have no desire whatsoever to 
alleviate class differences. As has already been discussed at length in Chapter 2, the AKP even 
intensified neoliberal policies, widening the economic gap between income levels. Therefore, two 
questions remain to be answered: why do the lower income classes keep politically supporting 
parties that offer no structural relief for their hardships – but are rather aggravating them – and 
what is the role of religion in this process?  
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Conclusion: Neoliberalism, Authoritarianism and Islamism as one 
Totality 
 
The neoliberal project has had a profound impact on Turkish and Egyptian society, disrupting the 
traditional configurations of both social relations and the state. It has caused a drop in the 
standards of living for the great majority of people and has altered the power structure of the 
state. At the same time we can observe a growing level of state authority and a rise of religious 
and nationalist conservatism. Indeed, these are all observable facts, well documented and to 
some extent even turned into quantitative objective information; but what does all of this mean? 
How can we interpret the relationship between these developments and how can we explain their 
causes?  
To provide some insight on these questions I return to Gramsci’s theory on state legitimacy and 
his notions of coercion and consent, as has already been introduced in the first chapter. With 
Gramsci, the existence of states are a dependent variable determined first and foremost by the 
level of consent they enjoy and thereafter the level of coercion they are able to exercise to 
compensate for the consent they lack. In this context, it is important to ask where the Turkish and 
Egyptian states derive their legitimacy from. Through their economic restructuring they have 
excluded the majority of their citizens from economic and social benefits while at the same time 
those that were doing well are doing even better. They have become states that are benefitting 
the few who exploit the many. The state did not become less transparent and socially equal 
despite its economic restructuring, but rather because of it. By giving the private sector significant 
influence in the decision-making process with the absence of solid democratic institutions, a rift 
occurred between the state and its citizenry, alienating the majority of people from their 
government. 
As the state had to give up on consent, it needed to compensate this with coercion. This happened 
in a number of ways, both directly and indirectly. First of all, the state became more authoritarian, 
expanding its military and intelligence apparatus, passing more restrictive legislation and granting 
itself more authority to desecrate human rights and undermine democratic institutions – like 
perpetually prolonging the state of emergency, something that is now also being witnessed in 
Turkey since July 15th 2016. By tightening their grip on power, state elites are trying to repress 
popular discontent that is being expressed through opposition movements. 
Second, they are constantly trying to build consent by focusing attention away from these issues 
and engaging in identity politics. In Turkey this has played out differently than in Egypt, as political 
power was and is still dependent on democratic elections. Therefore the state cannot solely rely 
on coercion; it has to look for new ways to legitimize itself by focusing on issues other than 
economic ones. Since a large number of the AKP’s electoral base is comprised of the poorer and 
uneducated segments of society, it was able to successfully address their national and religious 
identity that cuts across all their particular identities, ultimately rendering them irrelevant. As 
such it has created a big divide in society of us versus them, or those that identify with the 
idealized and romanticized picture of Turkey and those that do not. For the AKP to accomplish its 
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goal it is merely enough to win half of the votes, as the other half can be forced to comply through 
coercive measures. Coercion does not only imply physical force however, it ranges from passing 
intrusive legislation and media censorship to altering the education system, setting up 
organizations that spread the government’s message which is being packaged as neutral 
information, and making the religious establishment an extension of its PR office. 22 
Since Egypt was already more authoritarian to begin with and the democratic way to political 
power was closed off, it did not have to go through too much trouble to legitimize itself; it could 
just step up coercive measures. It is able to finance this due to the great amount of foreign 
financial aid it still receives today. Therefore, the Egyptian state has been more passive in this 
regard, with the rhetoric it uses being more cynical in character; “we know very well that there 
are problems but there is no alternative, this government is the only one that can contain some 
of the misery”. The Muslim Brotherhood is able to contest this cynical approach precisely because 
it is an empty shell, it does not offer any justification other than desperate fatalism. Nonetheless, 
the MB does not address class issues either, rather it explains economic inequality through its 
own Islamist narrative in order to mobilize society, leaving class inequality untouched.  
In this respect it can be compared with the AKP, which has deployed the same tactic. Indeed, both 
the AKP’s and the MB’s foundational thrust are constituted of middle-class businessmen from the 
more conservative strata of society. Although they have been able to benefit from the economic 
reforms that have been implemented in recent decades, they have been ignored by the political 
establishment. The AKP’s and the MB’s success have been a result of their efforts to transform 
their economic accomplishments into political influence, while the traditional secular elite has 
failed to address some of the most critical socio-economic issues. Simultaneously, this same elite 
has prepared a societal base for the Islamist movement through decades of repression against 
the secular Left. By undermining the lower classes’ ability to recognize class divisions as the root 
of their torment, the only way remaining to express their discontent was through the conservative 
right, something that the Islamist movements were more than willing to exploit. In this sense, the 
proposed antagonism of secularists versus Islamists, nationalists versus apostates – or basically 
us versus them – is a false one. They are fabricates that serve to mystify the class struggle that lies 
underneath its surface. Through the creation of false identities the neoliberal state has 
undermined its own liberal and secular values – rendering them hollow and meaningless – and 
has created a sharp divide throughout society. In fact, the main variable that separates the 
outcome of the neoliberal project in Turkey from the one in Egypt is the fact that in the former 
popular discontent was able to express itself democratically and therefore it has manifested itself 
in a completely different manner. By getting itself elected and wielding state power, the AKP was 
able to propagate its Islamist message more effectively and undermine liberal democracy itself. 
How then are we to understand this process of democratic regression within the context of 
neoliberalism? The Marxian notion of totality can be of useful assistance here. In order to 
understand a phenomenon in its totality we have to be aware of all its relations and symptoms. 
In this sense, neoliberalism and Islamism are part of the same totality, for the former has created 
the latter by undermining communal values and aggravating class divisions, while at the same 
                                                     
22 Mosques and other religious institutions in Turkey are funded and run by the state through the 
Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı). 
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time directing attention away from this process and attacking the secular Left that was upholding 
the ideals of egalitarian democracy. Indeed, after the Turkish military coup in 1980, it was Evren 
himself who actively promoted Islam to counter Leftist activism under the assumption that a pious 
youth will cause “no harm” to society. 
Discussion and limitations 
In this research paper I have made a qualitative inquiry into the connection between neoliberalism 
on the one hand and authoritarianism and Islamism on the other. From all of the above we can 
derive three facts: Turkey and Egypt (1) both implemented far-reaching neoliberal policies, (2) 
both grew closer to each other in the way power is constructed and distributed, and (3) both have 
become more Islamist. Although these developments may seem disconnected at first, it should 
be clear by now that this is actually not the case; they are very much interrelated, interdependent 
and are all outcomes of the very same process, the process of class domination. While this is the 
process that is unfolding on the national scale, it is important to remember that this is part of a 
broader development in which sovereign governments are being made subordinate to the 
interests of global capital through the conditioned loan packages of the IFIs and the economic 
policies of Western powers. Therefore, in a deeper sense, the questions regarding neoliberalism 
and authoritarianism ultimately lead down to questions regarding national sovereignty. To what 
extent can we call nations truly sovereign if their economic policy is being forced into submission 
through debt and other mechanisms? If we want the different peoples and nations that constitute 
humankind to be truly masters of their own fate, it is time for us to break away from the system 
of imperialism and subjugation. Recognizing the fact that this is not possible with the outdated 
economic models that are still being used today is a first step in the right direction. If we want to 
address issues like war, poverty, social injustice and human rights violations, we need to address 
the problems that lie at the heart of these issues. To this end I hope this paper has made a 
contribution by examining the practical implementations and effects of neoliberalism in a 
comparative case study.  
Nevertheless, I have been limited in this exercise on a number of points. First of all, I was limited 
in my space and therefore I could not cover some topics which are highly relevant for this 
research, like the events regarding the Gülen movement in Turkey – the so-called 17-25th of 
December operations, the corruption cases, and the 15th of July attempted coup and its aftermath 
– and the post-Mubarak events that unfolded after the election of Morsi as president and which 
had a deep impact on Egypt’s current configuration.  
At the same time, as is common when doing research on these topics, there is a limitation 
regarding the information I was able to obtain. Since the subject of this research continues to be 
controversial and contradicts official narratives that are being propagated through mainstream 
channels of dissemination, it remains challenging to establish the link between the different 
concepts. For instance, how much of the reconfigurations of state power can be truly attributed 
to the neoliberal reforms? In other words, to what extent are the events causally related instead 
of being correlated? As such, there is more room for interpretation of the information that is 
being presented than I am comfortable with. This being said, I do believe that the theoretical 
framework that has been presented in this paper – despite its limitations – has a greater 
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explanatory power than the mainstream theories of economics, precisely because they fail to 
connect economic policy to political context. 
Finally then, some trends remain to be observed which – at least for the time being – go against 
the findings of this research. One of these is the dropping rate of Muslims and the rise of less 
religious worldviews like deism and atheism in Turkey.23 It seems that there is a popular counter-
reaction against the suffocating use of religion by the government, as more and more young 
people are turning away from traditional beliefs. In this respect it might be regarded as a form of 
protest – to actively disengage from the political identification process that the AKP has crafted 
so carefully. The upcoming elections by June 24th 2018 will reveal how much of the national 
discourse of the AKP is actually grounded and will earn President Erdoğan another victory; with 
the current deteriorating state of both the economy and democratic institutions, there is not 
much else left to keep supporting him, or so it seems. At the same time Egypt’s President Sisi is 
manifesting himself more and more as a “Mubarak-style” leader, given the manner in which the 
last elections have played out. His involvement in the imprisonment and torture of tens of 
thousands of Egyptians, the deaths of thousands more, and the way he is greatly endorsed by 
both the Trump administration and Netanyahu reminds one very much of the situation prior to 
the Arab Spring.24 It remains to be seen how all of this will play out but one thing is certain, the 
cultural and political transformation of both Turkey and Egypt are far from being finished. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
23 BBC news website from May 10, 2018: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-43981745. Accessed 
May 30, 2018.  
24 Vox news article from April 3, 2018: https://www.vox.com/2018/3/26/17033030/egypt-elections-
results-sisi-president-trump. Accessed May 30, 2018. 
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